This appears to be a version of the Kantian view that the source of (practical) normativity is to be found in the agent: the normative authority of a value for an agent lies in the fact that he "created" it, from which it follows that an agent cannot value anything without also valuing his self as the source of this valuation. Second, there is a reciprocal relation in Nietzsche between valuing, self-creation, and self-affirmation: to determine such and such to be of value is to determine oneself and to affirm oneself by way of affirming what one values, and vice versa.
Nietzsche's practical philosophy rests on a "view of valuation as reflexive affirmation" (10), by which Gardner means two things:įirst, the subject who values must understand himself - his self - as the ground of the value that he affirms…. This theoretical fictionalist view of the self stands in conflict with the conception of the self that seems presupposed by his practical philosophy. Nietzsche's theoretical approach to the self is eliminativist : the self is a fiction. Gardner's opening essay exposes a fundamental tension in Nietzsche's views of the self. I will review each group of essays in turn, and, for ease of presentation, not necessarily in the order in which they appear in the collection. And almost all of the remaining contributions (those by Robert Pippin, Simon May, John Richardson, and Peter Poellner) examine Nietzsche's conception(s) of freedom and autonomy as an ethical ideal. More than half of the contributions (those by Sebastian Gardner, Ken Gemes, Christopher Janaway, Brian Leiter, Aaron Ridley, David Owen, and Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick) are primarily devoted to the Nietzschean conception of the self, specifically of the self understood as will or agency. The second question bears on what it is for that self to be, or to achieve, freedom and autonomy: contributions that consider this question tend to treat freedom as an ethical ideal to be pursued by individuals who already are selves or agents. The first concerns the nature of the self to which freedom and autonomy are attributed: contributions that concentrate on this question tend to treat freedom as a defining feature of selfhood, or agency. The contributions collected in Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy can be divided into two groups, each focusing on one basic aspect of the question of freedom and autonomy. This collection of essays by some of the finest Nietzsche scholars, edited by Ken Gemes and Simon May (whose helpful introduction also outlines its contents), is a spirited attempt to fill that scholarly gap. For this reason, they have not been the object of much focused, systematic scholarly treatment. Nietzsche's views on freedom and autonomy are confined to short, provocative statements dispersed throughout his writings.
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